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APPROVED B ITTEE 
Bernard V. Burke, Chainnan 
One of the most significant events in th~ Cold War-dominatedvears 
of the 1950 1 s and early 1960's was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, 
It not only has been reruted by most authorities as a major turning 
point in the Soviet Union-American struggle , but it dramatically il-
lustrated the critical dimension of thermo-nuclear weapons in inter-
national relations, In addition , and of particular interest to one 
directly involved , it showed that firmness in policy and proper ap-
plication of military power are key factors in obtaining favorable 
and peaceful settlecents of international disputes. 
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The proper employment of rnited States '1j l i • ary forces played a 
major role in brin;;ing this Crisis to a succcs~ful ..:oncli:-;::ion . At the 
time of the Crisis this writer ·.~·as a rr.etr;her of the staff of the Unified 
Con.::1ander , Commander in Chief Atlantic (Cl~CLANT) • Admir~l Robert E. 
D<;nnison . The major focus of this t~1esis is on the actions taken by 
this Cor'.lwanJer in carrying out t':ie policies and actions ordered by the 
President , As the Unified Cor:mander of t!-le area. in which Cuba is loc-
ated Cl~CLA~T was charged with the operational responsibilities of that 
area , 
The problems of researc'1 ~re still complicated by non-availabi l-
ity of certain key dpcuments relative to the Crisis . ~any o f the mil-
itary decisions were based on r.1aterial carried over cnBmunications 
channels so highly classified tha t many more years ,,f time-sanitization 
wil be rt~uired before public release, 
:lost of the data that has been released became :wailahle ti..rough 
the efforts of Elie Abel. His hook , The Cuban ;~::!s;,ile Cd.::-i:;, is b::is-
ec on :'.'ersonal interviews t;ith n:my of the "rinciT'als of t11(: ExecuUvc 
Can:..i tt ee: that •ms farmed by President .fohr. r, Kennedy to ccntrC'l the: 
.:=-risis. This book is the best account of how the decisi on-°"akin:? rirc--
cess wcrKed curing those critical davs of late Octo~er , 146~. Ot~er 
value~lc infor~ation was obtained from books written by the President ' s 
close advisors , ca';Ji::i.et nemhers <ind his brotl-ier 1 Robert . All of these 
writi~~s, ~hich cac~ i~ a flurrv ri~ht after the Cr isis, eive an excel-
lent back~round , hut nre s~snecc until more sunnorting material is de-
classified , To show ho~ closely sowe of the data i s still guarded a 
good exam~le cornes fro~ a recent book b7 Abram Chayes , I ronically , 
Professor Chayes was not _permitted to publish a memorandum on the leg-
al aspects prepared by one of his assiS'tants during the Crisis when 
3 
he ~~as the Legal Advisor to the State Departnent. Since this memorand-
um, as explained by Chayes, 1¥as not ori&inally classified, this refus-
al best illustrates that the secrecy problem still exists, 
In all the writings on the subject there is very little focus on 
the preparations of the military, es~ecially CINCLANT 1 prior to the 
Crisis, This thesis will focus on how this staff prepared for and ex-
ecuted the missions assigned, In addition it will ~sscss the military 
performance during the Crisis. Most of the information relative to 
the functions of CINCLANT and the military is hased on the ex~eriences 
of this writer and has not been tested by the experts who have written 
on this sub.ject. 
Based on the material that is available and on this writer's ex-
periences the following conclusions on the United States Military role 
in the Crisis are forwarded: 
(1) The Cuban :iissile Crisis was not an end to the Cold War, but 
it was a major turning point and a change of attitude by both parties. 
The military would be involved in new problem~, such as arms limitations, 
(2) The Soviet leaders learned the danger of a direct confrontation 
with the United States. From all that has been written they oust know 
that the oilitary was in full readiness for any action called for by 
the President. (3) President Kennedy learned that he Must strive for 
more O?tions in dealing with our Soviet rivals. He was ~eriously con-
cerned with the "military resl"'onse" syndror:ie of his advisers. (4) The 
Crisis illustrated that the United States ;Ulitarv r:iust at all times 
4 
be ready to apply limited . force because the consequences of nuclear 
power demand that those forces not be used. (5) The military learned 
that the decision-making process had moved to the White House in actions 
that could involve nuclear or conventional warfare. (6) The overall 
performance of the United States ~-Iili tary was excellent and many tact-
ical and technical lessons were learned. 
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.CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
As a student of the Cold War and the related diplomatic scenario 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cuban Missile Crisis 
of 1962, especially as it relates to the participation . of the United 
States military, has been of paramount interest to this writer. It not 
only has been reputed as a key turning point towards more understanding 
relations in the United States-Soviet Union Cold War struggle, but it 
dramatically illustrates the added significance of thermo-nuclear weap-
ons in international diplomacy. 
In late 1962, when Nikita Khrushchev took his stupendous gamble 
by placing nuclear offensive weapons into Cuba, he not only set the 
stage for a direct confrontation, and possibly a thermo-nuclear war, 
by the two super-powers, but he made a basic change in Soviet policy 
as far as it related to entrusting the location of such weapons in one 
of her satellites. From the beginning of the resultant diplomatic ex-
change it was obvious that a new plateau had been reached in the Cold 
War. More than ever, world power had been polarized on the shoulders 
of the leaders of the two concerned nations. The stakes were so high 
for President John F. Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, that the decis-
ion-making process immediately moved to the summit in each government. 
It was restricted to a few top-level aides and was conducted under the 
utmost secrecy. 
These factors have complicated the problem of research, since 
some of the key documents have not been de-classified and made avail-
able for analysis. The initial efforts of Elie Abel to gain personal 
interviews with many of the participants in the American decisions are 
extremely helpful, and are well reported in his book, The Cuban Missile 
Crisis, which is still the best account of the events. Until some of 
the more highly classified documents are made available, this book is 
a key to any student of this complicated international event. 
Books written by President Kennedy's close advisers, his brother 
Robert, Theodore Sorenson, ·l'lcGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara, and others, 
have good background material but need close scrutiny for self-serving 
points-of-view and emotions resulting from the presidential assassin-
ation and related events. When more classified materials are made av-
ailable, some of the conflicts contained in these books and articles 
may be settled, thus making them more valuable, historically. 
There was a great amount of reporting on the Crisis, during and 
immediately after it happened. Most of the writings since then have 
been repetitive and based on magazine articles that followed the Crisis 
and Abel's classic work. Most of these works are generally favorable 
to the American actions and are almost completely lacking in present-
ation of the Soviet side of the story. As is the case of all the Cold 
War crises, the Soviet Union has chosen to keep officially silent about 
her actions, All the scholarly works stress the fact that more real 
material from the Soviet side is necessary before a balanced story can 
be told. 
Not the least part of my interest in this event comes from my 
direct participation as a military officer. Hy military assignment, 
after the tragedy of the Bay of Pigs, was to the Staff of the Commander 
in Chief Atlantic, (CINCLANT), Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet, 
(CINCLANTFLT). Both these hats of command were worn by Admiral Robert 
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F. Dennison, who would play the key military command role in the Crisis . 
as the Unified Commander of the area concerned, My specific staff as-
signment was as Fleet Air Operations Officer, with further duties as 
CINCLANT Officer-in-Charge of the Joint Reconnaissance Center (CINCLANT 
JRC). This latter billet involved the duties of planning and supervis-
ing the conduct of all aerial reconnaissance and some of the surf ace 
surveillance of Cuba, before, during and after the Crisis. The sensit-
ive nature of the operations, relative to Cuha, gave this position on 
CINCLANT's staff a high level security clearance. This factor made this 
writer privy to most of the sensitive material relative to operations 
that has not been released. It is not within the purview of this thesis 
to expose highly classified material, but rather to use this background 
to tell the military side of the Cuban Missile Crisis. These operations 
were not only unique in concept, but were to be a test of the readiness 
of the new military force diversification policy and crisis management 
as it related to the performance of the mil:i. tary. 
The first part of the thesis sutmnarizes those events which were 
preliminary to the Crisis. A brief history of United States-Cuban rel-
ations prior to the Cuban Revolution, which brought Fidel Castro to pow-
er and moved Cuba into the Soviet orbit, is ~art of this chapter. The 
involvement in and the effects on the United States :Uli tary of the Bay 
of Pigs tragedy is also included in this chapter as necessary back~round 
information. The pre-Crisis Soviet-United St~tes exchange s are covered 
with a focus on how the presence of the missiles was discovered. 
The next chapter examines the decision-ma~in~ ~rocess by the Pres-
ident and the Executive Committee. President Kennedy was -presented with 
a myriad of political, dirlomatic, domestic, and military problems when 
he was made aware of the installation of Soviet offensive nuclear weap-
ons in Cuba. Emphasis is given on the relationship of the President 
and his staff t~ the military and how the controversies connected with 
this relationship influenced the morale and performance of the United 
States forces during the Crisis. 
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Under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCLANT had 
prepared a series of military plans to handle any eventuality, relative 
to Cuba• after the revolution brought Castro to power. These plans were 
up-dated on a priority basis after the increased Soviet influence and 
presence, resultant from the Bay of Pigs invasion and other related ev-
ents. The next chapter covers the execution by CINCLANT. the Unified 
Commander, of those parts of these plans ordered by the President in 
relation to the Crisis. Much of the information in this chapter is 
based on the experience of the writer and has not been examined in de-
tail by the better-known studies. 
The conclusion contains this writer's judgments on how well the 
military was employed and how they performed during the Crisis. In 
addition. each conclusion that had an eventual effect on the military 
is appraised. This examination is divided into three broad cat-
egories and how each of these effected the military: First, the dip-
lomatic results; second, the internal decisions; and third• the les-
sons learned by the military in the deployment and design of hardware 
and other military functions. 
· CHAPTER II 
PRELIMINARIES 
Thoughtful Americans very early realized the strategic importance 
of Cuba. Its close proximity to the United States plus the dominant 
position of Cuba relative to the main trade routes into the ' caribbean 
and the Gulf of Mexico, fostered interest in the island throughout the 
19th century. By mid-century American aspirations increased as the ec-
onomic potential of Cuba was developed. Private invasions (filibusters), 
made up for the most part of Cuban refugees based in the United States, 
were a continuous source of sensationalism that led to almost continuous 
American involvement in the Spanish colony with resultant troubles and 
1 
deteriorating relations. 
About this same time increased pressures for expansion by Arner-
ican slave interests and economic adventurers centered on Cuba, and num-
erous moves were made to acquire the island. These schemes of annex-
ation failed because of the involvement of the sectional slave contro-
versy and direct opposition of France and Great Britain to a change in 
Cuba's status as a colony of a weak Spanish empire. 
After the United States concluded her Civil War, internal revol-
utionary activity in Cuba brought a campaign of cruelty and terror. In 
this unrest, Spain was cast into the difficult role of suppressing a 
popular rebellion aimed at independence for an oppressed people. Direct 
1 
R. G. Caldwell, The L~pez Expeditions to Cuba, 1848-1851 (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1915), PP• 12-17. It is ironic that 
the most famous of these expeditions, led by Narciso Lopez ended in 
dismal failure, a forerunner of the more famous Bay of Pigs of 1961, 
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United States military intervention was resisted by American leaders un-
til the disaster of the Maine, in Havana Harbor. led to war with Spain 
in 1898, 
After the Spanish-American War, the United States exercised a maj-
or influence on the economic and political development of Cuba, This 
lasted until the suspension of the sugar quota in 1960 and the result-
ant break in diplomatic relations in 1961. From 1902 to 1934, this in-
fluence was exercised according to the Platt Amendment, a statement of 
the United States view towards relations between the two countries. This 
Amendment was incorporated into the Cuban constitution. It made Cuba 
a protectorate and gave the United States the right to intervene when 
it was thought desirable to protect Cuban independence. Also, the Gov• 
ernment of Cuba was required to protect life, property. and the pursuit 
of individual liberty of its citizens or the United States could inter-
fere, The United States was also ceded a permanent base, for naval pro-
tection. of the Panama Canal, in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, In 1934• these 
policies were changed, The United States kept Guantanamo. but in con-
sonance with a generally more enlightened policy toward Latin America, 
the United States government relaxed its control over Cuba, The Amer-
ican policies in Cuba during the 1930's and up to World War II were 
rooted in economics, specifically, on the sugar quota. During this 
war, Cuba made a significant economic advance because sugar demand 
stabilized prices at a high level, but afterwards dependence on the 
United States returned as sugar prices fluctuated over a wide and gen-
erally lower range, 
The Cuban governments in the late 1930's, 40!s, and up to 1952 
were corrupt and gangster-like but maintained a form of constitution-
ality. In 1952, General Eulgencio Batista took control by a military 
coup. At first, this was generally well accepted by the politically 
bankrupt nation • . Batista.- protected American interests, but his sad-
istic' henchmen fostered a tyranny, disdained by most Americans and ab-
solutely abhorred by the majority of Cubans. This set the stage for 
Fidel Castro's rise to power in 1958, 
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The Cuban disenchantment with the United States in the late 1950's 
was patented for the Soviet desires to embarrass the United States and 
foster the new Soviet theory of National Democracy, based on associat-
ion of Third World countries, while fully converting to Communist ideol-
ogy, Cuba was for some time the Soviet Union's greatest Third World 
achievment, The Castro revolution meant a development of a community 
of interest with the Soviet Union, It was a foreign policy windfall 
and has alternated between the extremes of disaster and complete suc-
cess, since the Soviet Union became involved, For the Soviet Union, 
the first gain was a great ideological "shot in the arm." Suddenly, 
there appeared a Latin American country, next to the United States, which 
had been dominated by the United States for 60 years, ready for deliver-
ance. Cuba had declared against the Capitalist-Imperialists and for Marx 
and Lenin. 
By early 1960, the Soviet Union made Cuba an arena for her renew-
ed aggressiveness, American relations with Cuba had deteriorated, and 
Cas~ro had moved from his initial non-Conununist pronouncements to a more 
radical approach, In this, the Soviet Union saw Cuba developing as a 
catalyst that would lead to other anti-American revolutions in the West-
ern Hemisphere. 
~n1en troubles between the United States and Cuba led to a break in 
8 
diplomatic relations, Khr~shchev was irresi~tibly tempted to play a more 
active role in Cuban affairs. He was sure that this presented the kind 
of opportunity to vin an international propaganda victory similar to the 
~ne that had just eluded him in the Congo. United States economic pol-
icies had caused chaos in Cuba, and Castro was forced to turn to ~-<oscow 
for rescue. 
The flood of Soviet technicians, planners, and military experts 
began , and thousands had arrived by the latter part of 1960. This help 
came in such a stream that Washington showed alarm and Congress, high-
ranking military officers, and other national leaders began to demand 
action, 2 One of the many fears that was expressed was the concern for 
the new ability to spread Soviet influence to other Latin American count-
ries from Cuba. 
By the end of 1960 1 the tens of thousands of refugees escapin~ 
from Castro's purges and property confiscations appeared to present an 
op~ortunity for the anti-Castro activists in the United States to reg-
ain control of Cuba. This ".Jas to be done with an invasion , which would 
count on t~e supnort of a lar~e bloc of anti-Castro Cu~an~ still in 
Cuba to join forces and expel cor:irnunism, 
Just before the chanp,in<! of president~, from Eisenhower to Ken-
nedy • plans for sue~ an invasion were formulated hy the Central Int-
elligence A~ency 1 (CIA). During the winter of 19~0-61 , the Cuban ref-
ugees were secretly armed, organized and trained by the United States, 
in order to provide a militarv fnrce to carry out the inva~ion, When 
2 
Louis J. Halle , The Cold War as Historv (New York 1 London: 
Harper & Row , 1971) 1 p . 404 . 
... 
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President Kennedy arrived on the scene, he was presented with a force 
in being designed to overthrow Castro, He had the unpopular choice of 
stopping the plan, which by now was getting considerable public attent-
ion, or letting it continue.3 
President Kennedy executed this plan, and when the invasion failed 
and resulted in the disaster of the Bay of Pigs, Castro moved more firm-
ly in.to the Soviet orbit, ~iuch has been written of the inept execution 
of the plan. The subject of many articles and books has been the lack 
of proper supporting air forces, logistics and the failure of sending 
American forces to the rescue, The crux of the matter, which caused 
the failure of the invasion, was that the American government had been 
guilty of hopelessly misreading the Cuban people, It was obvious from 
the way the Cubans rallied behind Castro that dislocation of the Cuban 
dictator, based on an internal uprising such as that required by the Bay 
of Pig• s plan, was improbable at that time, 
The Bay of Pigs was a serious error in American policy and was a 
significant factor in causing Castro to announce the socialist nature 
of his revolution. He was recognized by Moscow as a Marxist building 
a socialist force in Cuba. In this he was helped by the American dis-
comfiture and feeling of guilt, a direct outgrowth of the Bay of Pigs. 
This gave Castro and his Soviet allies almost complete assurance that 
further attempts at the displacement of the Cuban dictator would be 
unlikely. 
For the Soviet Union the Bay of Pigs confirmed the leadership's 
3 
Halle, p. 405. 
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initial feeling of an apparent lack of resolution of the young American 
president.4 As a result 1 the Soviet arms build-up was accelerated. Us-
ing the invasion as an example of the aggressive American policy toward 
Cuba, it was easy for the Soviet leadership to explain, both at home and 
abroad, that the new weapons shipments were necessary to bring Cuba to 
a defensive level which would avoid further aggression by the United 
States. Khrushchev, in responding to American action, appeared to be 
protecting small nations. 
For President Kennedy and his new administration, the Bay of Pigs 
was a dismal failure. From it he learned that he could not trust his 
experts completely in either the intelligence, military and diplomatic 
5 
areas. Even though the ill-fated invasion was a definite set-back, 
it did not change the basic direction of the Kennedy administration. 
It was still activist and if anything was even more eager to flex its 
muscles. The President wanted to show Khrushchev and the Soviets that 
he was tough-minded, that the Bay of Pigs had been an accident and that 
it was not a reflection of his will, 6 
For the United States military the Bay of Pigs was particularly 
frustrating, It was an operation in which they had no real part as 
far as the determination of the outcome was concerned. The Joint Chiefs 
4 
Adam G, Ulam, The Rivals (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), 
p. 320. 
5 
Roger Hilsman, To Hove a ~fation (Garden City, New York: Doubleday 
and Co., 1967). PP• 31-32. 
6 
David Halberstam, The Best and the BriBhtest (Uew York: Random 
House, 1969), pp, 71-72, 
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of Staff were originally consulted in the planning, but by the time 
the plan was activated it no longer resembled the original ideas. How-
ever, because of the very nature of the event, a great deal of criticism 
of the military was forthcoming when the operation failed, President 
Kennedy came out of the Bay of Pigs adventure skeptical of professional 
advice, a factor that downgraded the overall importance of military 
advisors in presidential decisions. In addition, the prestige of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff was hurt because the President became very wary 
of their advice and turned more toward his civilian specialists.7 
Huch of the normal system of military intelligence against Cuba was ·· 
weakened after the ill-fated invasion resulted in the loss or discredit 
of operatives and established information channels. 
As a further reaction to the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy 
placed more emphasis on special commissions to study and report on 
specific military problems. He did not necessarily by-pass the ad-
vice of the JCS, but he decimated their policy-making powers by moving 
control of military decisions into the White House. Even before the 
Bay of Pigs he had increased the importance in military decisions 
of an array of young and bright civilian aides who were organized 
under the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara . ~ore and more the 
Secretary and his team operated the defense establishment with de-
8 
cisions based on cost effectiveness and management control. This 
method was suspiciously eyed by the military and some congressmen 
7 
Elie Abel, The :URsile Crisis (Philadelphia, New York: J.P. 
Lippincott Co., 1966), P• 40. 
8 
Theodore c. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 
p. 606. 
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because it placed key weapons systems decisions into the hands of 
these civilian advisers. In the eyes of the President the established 
military advisory system had failed during the Bay of Pigs . This 
caused him to place more faith in the direction of McNamara and his new 
managers . 
Over the years the military and civilian planners in the Depart-
ment of Defense followed a strategic planning concept which was de-
signed to stop the expansion of the Soviet Union . The new policies 
seemed to stop the interest in this approach . Crisis management , 
flexible response and balanced forces for "brush fire" wars were the 
new challenge. By 1961, McNamara had introduced administrative con-
cepts which brought the decision-making process almost entirely to 
his office. Centralization of authority had taken a giant step . Many 
professional military officers , including this writer , disagreed with 
this approach and contended that strategic advice and the selection of 
~~mament should flow from conunand positions within the armed forces. 9 
In late January of 1962 , the Punte del Esta Conference of the 
O~ganization of American States (OAS) , was held in Uruguay. The 
conference decided to exclude Cuba from the OAS , a much milder action 
than that desired by the United States. By February of 1962, bus-
iness and political leaders of both parties were demanding stronger 
action to prevent the Soviet from exerting more influential control 
over Cuba . In response to this pressure the ~resident declared an 
economic embargo against Cuba on February 3. 
In mid-summer 1962, reports became more numerous that the ship-
9 
Henry A. Kissinger , ed., Problems of National Strategy 
(New York, London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 443. 
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ment of Soviet arms and troops to Cuba were being increased, This 
brought demands from the leadership of both political parties for action 
that would stop the Soviet build-up. When the first surf ace-to-air 
(SAM) missiles were detected in late August, the President's Republican 
opposition became more outspoken. With the Congressional elections 
just weeks away, the Cuban issue became very important to those poli-
ticians facing tough re-election contests. Republican Senator Homer 
Capehart of Indiana was one of these, and he demanded that President 
Kennedy order an invasion to remove the Cuban problem, The main 
political antagonist against the administration's Cuban policies was 
Senator Kenneth Keating of New York. At the end of August he took 
the Senate floor and warned of the arms build-up in Cuba, He urged a 
hard-line against the Soviet Union and Cuba to replace the Democratic 
"do-nothing policy," 
President Kennedy was faced with a unique situation in early 
September. His political opponents were demanding more action against 
Cuba, in some cases urging an invasion, Meanwhile , the Cubans were 
charging that the President was .already planning an invasion. On 
September 2, his position was further complicated when, during a 
Che Guevara visit, the Soviet Union announced the supply of further 
arms and technicians to train Cubans to meet aggressive imperialism. 10 
In response to these pressures, President Kennedy issued a warning 
to the Soviet Union on September 4, 1962 . This was an attempt to 
head off further congressional criticism, and to this end the president 
pledged that he would use "whatever means necessary" to prevent ag-
10 
Louise FitzSimons, The Kennedy Doctrine (Xew York: Random 
Houee 1 1972), P• 129-130. 
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gression from Cuba to the Western Hemisphere. He also summarized his 
feeling on the situation in Cubat by stating that there was no evidence 
of any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet-bloc country. He 
also warned that the gravest of issues would arise should the Soviet 
Union bring in offensive missiles.11 
This warning, by President Kennedy, worried Khrushchev. He sent 
Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatol Dobrynin, to see Robert 
Kennedy. to reassure the United States leaders that there were no offen-
sive weapons in Cuba,12 
Khrushchev kept probing, During a meeting with poet Robert Frost 
he made the statement that the United States was "too liberal t o fight," 
On September 11, 1962, the Soviet Union increased the pressure on the 
President by warning that any attack by the United States, on Cuba or 
on Soviet ships bound for Cuba, would mean nuclear-rocket war, 13 
This increased pressure brought forth another important statement 
from President Kennedy. On September 13, he said that the United States 
WQuld defend its security as it was endangered by the Soviet actions in 
Cuba, but he saw no need for military action at this time. This state-
ment did not stop the political hue and cry. Senator Barry r.oldwater 
assailed the administrative policy again as "do-nothing" and, along with 
11 
FitzSimons, p. 131, 
12 
Stewart Alsop, "In Times of Crisis," Saturday Evening Post, 
CCXXXVI, (Dec . 8, 1962) , pp . 16-19. 
13 
David L, Larson. ed. The Cuban ~fissile Crisis, Selected Docum-
ents and Chronology (Boston: Hou~hton Mifflin Co., 1963), p. 306, 
15 
other Senate Republicans. he tried to add a military warning to a bill 
which authorized a cal l up of selected reserves. 14 In addition, pres-
sure for a stronger stand included a call by former Vice President 
Richard Nixon for a Naval blockade against Cuba. 
On September 21 1 1962 1 Soviet Foreign ~linister 1 Andrei A. Gromyko, 
issued a new warning in the United Nations that a United States attack 
on Cuba would mean war.15 
By September 26 1 1962 1 the pressure for more stringent action by 
President Kennedy again increased. A joint resolution of Congress . 
which had been passed on September 20th by the Senate by a vote of 86 
to 1 1 passed the House 394 to 7. It expressed American determination 
to prevent the regime in Cuba from extending its aggressive or subver-
sive activities to any part of the hemisphere. The resolution also stat-
ed that the United States was determined to prevent "the creation or use 
of an externally supported military capability endangering the security 
of the United States. 1116 There was no doubt that the Republican lead-
ership was trying to take political advantage from the Cuban problem, 
but the large majority support that the resolution received would have 
some influence on the tough decisions that the President made later. 
At the time of the resolution the President passed it off as necessary 
for the Congress to let off steam and satisfy pressure from their con-
14 
FitzSimons, - P• 135, 
15 
Larson, p. 308. 
16 
FltzSimons, pp . 137-138. 
stituents. 
Later in September verbal attacks on the American position, rel-
ative to Cuba, by the Soviets and her satellites continued. Soviet 
16 
President Leonid Breshnev reiterated the earlier Gromyko statement that 
an attack on Cuba meant war~ The Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, 
17 
attacked United States foreign policy on Cuba in the United Nations. 
Early October saw more foreign policy maneuvering between Pres-
ident Kennedy and Khrushchev. This included another attempt by Khrush-
chev to get the former to visit Moscow for a summit conference. The 
Soviet leader felt he could gain favorable advantages regarding both Cuba 
and Berlin from such a meeting. Kennedy remembered the difficulties he 
had with Khrushchev in Vienna and refused such a meeting at this time. 
In countering Khrushchev's diplomatic initiatives, Kennedy continued 
to tighten the economic sanctions against Castro by pressuring America's 
allies to cease shipments to Cuba. By October 4, the United States Gov-
ernment announced its plan to penalize all ship owners who still hauled 
Soviet bloc materials to Cuba. This was to be accomplished by the rev-
ocaticn of favorable trade status and application of economic sanctions 
against those who continued to ship to Castro. 
The Cuban-Soviet objections to the American "Naval Blockade" were 
again voiced in the United Nations, this time by President Osvaldo Dort-
icos of Cuba, on October 8, 1962, In his address before the General 
Assembly he denounced the United States shipping policies and renewed 
accusations that preparations for an invasion were continuing. There 
17 
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was some truth to this last charge for by this time CINCLANT was in the 
advanced stages of planning for a possible invasion. Dorticos also pro-
tested against the renewed activity by Cuban exile organizations, pri-
marily Alpha 66, which pursued attacks against Cuban crops and shipping. 18 
While these 1962 diplomatic exchanges and maneuvers for world op-
inion were going on, the United States intelligence community was becpa-
ing more concerned about the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba, This 
concern was based on refugee reports from Cuba and also on more sophis-
ticated methods of collection. The information was being filtered at 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) processing center for Cuba, loc-
ated in Opa Locka, Florida, By late summer, these reports indicated the 
possibility that offensive weapons were being introduced into Cuba, To 
confirm this, aerial reconnaissance activity over Cuba was stepped up 
and U-2 high altitude flights were flown on September 5, 17, 26, 29, 
and October 5 and 7. These flights did not reveal anything beyond the 
previously discovered SAMS. These flights had bee~ east of Havana, be-
cause of the increased possibility of the destruction of the U-2's by 
SAMS, the weather, and confusion in the management of this vital act-
ivity. There were two factors involved in the management problem, the 
controversy concerning the operation of the U-2's, between the CIA and 
the United States Air Force, and the fact that the control of all act-
ivities over and around Cuba had not been fully passed to the Unified 
Commander concerned (CINCLANT) for coordination, It was these two fact-
ors that, in my estimation, hampered the intelligence gathering effort 
18 
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and• when combined with high classification created by the many bureau-
cratic managers involved. delayed earlier identification of the presence 
of the offensive missiles in Cuba. 
The control of all aircraft. while they were over or around Cuba• 
was finally accomplished under an adjunct of CINCLA..~T JRC, located in 
Key West, Florida, This activity, known as the Joint Air Reconnaissance 
Coordination Center (JARCC), was created to monitor or control all air 
activity concerned with Cuban operations, CINCLANT had asked for a 
change in his force structure to create a flag billet under his direct 
command in order to supervise Cuban air and sea operations. The billet 
was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander , Key West 
Forces . (COMKEYWESTFOR)• manned by a Navy admiral, was charged with this 
mission. The control provided directly under CINCLANT by this vital com-
mand and control change became an absolute necessity as the air activity 
increased, and had it been set up and working at an earlier date than 
just before the Crisis. the problem of late information would probably 
have been avoided. The creation and problems invo~ved with this new 
structure will be covered more fully in a later chapter, 
In any event. the photos confirming the presence of the missiles 
were finally obtained and were in Washington by October 15• 1962, They 
were presented to President Kennedy the following day, October 16 mark-
ed the beginning of a reriod of tense activity known as the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DECISION 
With the delivery of the firm evidence of offensive nuclear mis-
siles in Cuba 9 President Kennedy was faced with a second great crisis. 
relative to Cuba, in his still young administration. The evidence that 
had been gathered with great difficulty and a certain amount of indec-
ision and confusion was definite. It proved that those advisors and 
critics who had warned about the offensive build-up in Cuba were cor-
rect. 
The greatest initial frustration for Kennedy was facing up to the 
fact that Khrushchev had deliberately lied in his assurances to Kennedy 
that offensive missiles would not be placed into Cuba. 19 For the Pres-
ident this was a personal challenge with deep political 9 diplomatic and 
military implications. His fears that Khrushchev had misjudged his det-
ermination were now realized, 
The second obvious fact was that the President's policy toward 
Cuba had been wrong. The worst fears of high level military and civ-
ilian leaders and President Kennedy's political opponent's predictions, 
that Cuba would be turned into a military fortress and thereby effect 
the balance of power, were now approaching reality. 
These two factors weighed heavily in the President's eventual dec-
ision9 but some other immediate issues would be of great influence: (1) 
If he took a weak stance the President would lose the confidence of his 
19 
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own party's congressmen, many of whom faced election in three weeks. 
(2) He had declared that such weapons would not be allowed in Cuba. Any 
retreat from this policy would destroy public confidence in the Pres-
ident. (3) Foreign powers would watch closely to see if President Ken-
nedy had the courage to face up to the challenge and back up his state-
ments. (4) Another retreat, so shortly after the Bay of Pigs, would 
undermine confidence in the President by most members of Congress and 
his own staff. (5) The President needed a victory to instill confidence 
in himself regarding his ability to do the job.20 
All of these factors and other pressures not so obvious indicated 
to President Kennedy that the only avenue available was strong, force-
ful action. To this end, the President, after his notification of the 
presence of the missiles in the early morning of the 16th of October, 
called a secret meeting of key national security officials and set up 
an Executive Committee, varying in size from 9 to 14 members. This 
group was to conduct the Cuban negotiations, under very tight security. 
The make-up of this group is interesting and covers a wide range of ex-
perience. From Defense there was Secretary ~1cNamara, Under-Secretary 
Roswell Gilpatrick and Special Advisor Paul Nitze. From State, Secre-
tary Dean Rusk, Under-Secretary George Ball, political specialist, Alexis 
Johnson, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson and 
Edwin Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy was there, as was General }faxwell Tay-
lor and sometimes, Admiral George Anderson from the Joint Staff. Sec-
20 
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retary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon and Presidential speech-writer 
Theodore Sorensen were present along with Special Assistant to the 
President for National Security McGeorge Bundy. CIA Director John Mc-
Cone replaced General Carter and Vice President Lyndon Johnson and Am-
bassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson were part-time repre-
21 
sentatives. 
This arrangement of setting up a special Executive Committee, 
has brought mixed reaction from those evaluating the performance of 
the Executive Branch of the Government during the Crisis. It was ob-
viously a reflection of the decision by the President to create special 
committees to study specific problems, rather than operating under the 
established governmental system. Secretary McNamara described its 
effectiveness as follows: "The performance of the United States Govern-
ment during the critical period was more effective than any other time 
22 during my seven years service as Secretary of Defense." Lately there 
has been criticism that such extra-ordinary efforts caused fatigue and 
stress with the result that not all the choices were carefully con-
sidered. 23 
President Kennedy emphasized the urgency of the situation when 
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he said: "Set aside all other tasks to take a prompt and intense sur-
vey of the dangers and all possible courses of action," At the same 
meeting he set the guidelines for the members of the Executive Com-
mi.ttee, "As fifteen individuals oP their own, representing the Pres-
ident and not their different departments," Sorensen goes on to say 
that the meetings were conducted with a sense of complete equality, 
where rank, protocol and experience meant little as compared to the 
24 life of the nation, Dean Acheson, who sat in on some of these ses-
sions as a special diplomatic advisor to the President, took excep-
22 
tion to the equality statement. He felt the sessions were repetitive, 
leaderless and a waste of time. He also stated that Rusk should have 
taken charge. 25 
The initial decision of the Committee boiled down to six basic 
options1 (l)Do nothing, Although this option had very little sup-
port, it was suggested that an outward calm attitude should be kept 
in regard to the presence of the missiles, Any comment should relegate 
them to a minor role in the overall Soviet and American nuclear capa-
bility, (2) Bring about removal by diplomatic pressure. In dis-
cussing this it was felt that the main avenues for such action were 
the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), or a 
direct approach to Khrushchev which would probably end up in an un-
desirable summit conference. Additionally, the suggested offer of a 
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trade for our Jupiter missiles in Turkey , would only cause more de-
mands from the Soviets and would convince our European allies that we 
would sacrifice them for our own security. (3) A secret approach to 
Castro. This was a weak course of ac tion because the Soviets maintained 
control of the missiles, (4) Invasion, This was a widely-supported 
option by the so-called "Hawks", a term reserved for those w".lnting strong 
military action, General Taylor, McCone, Rusk, Nitze and Acheson, It 
was relegated as a step to be taken should the blockade fail, (5) Sur-
gical Air Strike, This measure was favored by President Kennedy at the 
beginning and by the "Hawks" throughout, When the President was in-
formed that such a plan would require 500 sorties to achieve 90% suc-
cess and when the surprise feature of such an attack was likened to Pearl 
Harbor, this plan was deserted, (6) Blockade, This plan was finally 
adopted, but not before its own problems were explored: (a) It could 
result in a reprisal by a Berlin blockade, (b) What would happen if 
the Soviet controlled ships refused to obey orders for search or change 
of course. (c) Any mention of blockade would violate the traditional 
United States posture of freedom of the seas, Members then looked at 
the advantages. (a) It was the middle course, between no action and an 
attack, (b) It put the next action squarely up to Khrushchev, (c) We 
were in a very superior Naval position to execute such a plan, (d) Even 
if the plan failed , it would still buy time for reaching a better in-
vasion posture, 26 
The members deliberated i n utmost secrecy and came up with the 
plan for the "Quarantine" after very pointed deliberations on all of 
26 
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the above, The decision for blockade against offensive weapons only 
and the more palatable name of Quarantine were decided on to keep the 
actions in a low key, This method was chosen over a complete blockade 
because it presented the lowest level of action and would be the l east 
l ikely to anger allies engaged in trade with Cuba, The Executive Cam-
mi ttee met at least three times a day during the height of t .he Crisis. 
In addition, the conferees kept in touch with their staffs and headed 
27 
up special projects relating to the Crisis, 
24 
The President kept to his normal routine as much as possible. He 
made a scheduled political trip to Connecticut on Wednesday, October 17. 
On Thursday, the 18th, he met with Andrei Gromyko, special envoy from 
Moscow, In this talk he deliberately avoided direct discussions relat-
ive to Cuba and patiently listened to the tough line Gromyko put for-
ward relative to Berlin, 28 
On the 19th of October, President Kennedy flew to the political 
hustings again, this time to the West Coast with a stop planned for 
Cleveland. His absence was scheduled for five days, but on the 20th of 
October he cancelled the rest of his trip using a cold as an excuse, 
He returned to Washington, and soon the real reason was to be uncovered 
by reporters, By Saturday, there was suspicion and speculation by. many 
that a real clash between the United States and the Soviet Union was 
near, 29 
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Meanwhile, Sorensen had been preparing a speech for the President, 
to present the picture to the American public and the world. This speech 
was checked with legal experts and the final draft was sent to the var-
ious departments and agencies for comment and suggestions for change, 
The Executive Committee had decided on complete secrecy to be further 
maintained until Monday the 22nd of October. This was to give the mil-
itary time to get ready and for the State Department to provide notice 
to the concerned American allies, There was a concern that the secrecy 
had been broken during the Gromyko visit, but a close check on his act-
ivities prior to his departure did not indicate that he had any extra-
ordinary knowledge. The final strategy meeting was held in the Oval 
Room on Sunday evening the 21st of October. October 22 was to be the 
first critical day, There was extreme tension as the President went 
over the final draft of the speech. Crowds, interspersed with "peace" 
pickets outside the White House added to the over-all drama, By noon, 
Press Secretary Pierre Salinger made the announcement to reporters of 
a major policy speech by the President that evening. His emphatic 
wording, "a matter of the highest national urgency," caused great ex-
30 
citement and reaction from the reporters who were present. 
From then on a well designed plan leading up to the President's 
speech went into action: (l) United States Military forces were placed 
on Defense Condition Three, a world-wide alert. (2) President Kennedy 
telephoned and briefed the three ex-presidents, Hoover, Truman and Eis-
enhower. (3) United States ambassadors notified the world leaders, first 
Great Britain and the NATO allies. (4) The Latin American Ambassadors 
30 
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were summoned to the State Department for a briefing, (5) The Soviet 
Union was notified last, an hour before the President went on the air, 
(6) At 3 P.M., the National Security Council met for a final briefing 
of the President's proposed actions. (7) At 4 P.M., the President met 
with the new Prime Minister of Uganda, in keeping with his business-as-
usual cover, (8) At 5 P.M., the Congressional leaders were briefed, 
This was a tense meeting and some leading Congressmen, including members 
of the Democratic party, urged more drastic actions than the proposed 
31 Quarantine. 
At 6:30 P,M. President Kennedy went on the air to inform the United 
St~tes and the world of the Crisis and to outline his decision to im-
pliment a Quarantine on shipments of offensive weapons to Cuba, In this 
speech the President laid down the challenge. He now faced the first 
test of nuclear weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
His speech outlined his mixed policies of strength, restraint and res-
pect for the opinions of the world.32 
Throughout the decision-making process there was a certain am-
ount of underlying tension between the President and his close civilian 
advisors on one hand, and the military on the other, Some of this was 
based on the mistrust of experts in general that came out of the Bay 
of Pigs affair. Sone of this conflict originated in the make-up of the 
President's security manasers who had very little faith in the military 
and a pronounced fear of what the military was capable of doing. Part 
of this fear, as expressed by James Nathan, was based on the assumption 
31 
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that the newly created "ready forces were eager to demonstrate their 
potential.1133 During my visits to the various units in place for the 
invasion, no evidence of the latter was seen beyond the normal h igh 
morale and excitement that comes with troops well-trained and ready 
for action. 
27 
From the beginning of the decision-making discussions, the mili-
tary position sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was predominantly 
for an air strike followed by an invasion to eliminate the entire prob-
lem of Castroism in Cuba. General David Shoup later stated that he 
was a dissenter in this position and was against invasion from the 
start.34 The President was very fa7orable to the Air Strike option in 
th~ beginning, but th~s was likel y because he had been given improper 
information by some of his advisors that the missiles could be removed 
by such a strike with complete assurance of success and with a minimum 
of damage to Cuba and her people. This misconception started from sour-
ces in the Department of Defense, probably supported by ambitious and 
less than compl~tely informed Air Force Officers. Since this writer 
parti ci pated in the preparation o~ ~uch a plan at the CINCLA.~T head-
quarters which was complete to the details of armament and expected 
casualties and losses, the Unified Commander was not the source of such 
a plan. The CINCLA::T plan included information that such a strike, 
in order to accomplish the objective of complete negation of the missile 
capability, would have to be all-inclusive of Cuban military targets, 
i ncluding the SAH sites and especially the Cuban :UG fighter aircraft. 
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Any strike short of being all-inclusive would have resulted in an un-
acceptable risk of the remaining nuclear strike potential in Cuba 
plus high losses of strike aircraft and flight crews, These conclus-
ions were s upported by General Walter C, Sweeney who was Commander 
Air Forces Atlantic (COMA.FL.ANT), and also the Comnander of the Tact-
ical Air Command (CO~ITAC) which provided the Air Force's ready strike 
aircraft, By the time the "surgical" air strike plan was presented to 
the President the first time, it should have been obvious that to in-
sure complete success, such a strike would have to be followed by an 
invasion, It was also obvious that the air strike would directly in-
volve attacks on Soviet military personnel, a factor which would most 
likely involve Soviet military response, The President was not ready 
to accept the risks and consequences of an invasion, so the air strike, 
35 
which would most likely lead to an invasion, was turned down, This 
was done at a direct meeting between the President and the members of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff which was held on October 19th and delayed 
the President's departure for Cleveland, The military leaders presented 
a plea for invasion or air strike, The arguments they presented were 
based strictly on the military picture and in the President's estim-
ation did not take into account the consequences of such an action, 
At this meeting the Chiefs also strongly opposed the Quarant ine ~rop-
osal , which they felt had little chance to get the missiles removed and 
would permit time to complete the Soviet construction,3~ The rneetin~ unset 
35 
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the President, since he felt the decision for blockade had been set-
tled the night before. It was now obvious to him that there was still 
29 
a deep division between his advisors on what action to take and that the 
military were not convinced that the action of blockade was enough. Be-
fore he departed on his political trip he told Sorensen and Robert Ken-
nedy that he was counting on them to pull the group together . quickly, 
so that action could be taken by Sunday, October 21. He also told his 
brother to call him back to Washington when they were ready. 37 
The President had his next meeting with representative-s of the 
military on Sunday, October 21. This meeting was attended by General 
Sweeney and members of his staff and was called for by the President 
to again review the air strike alternatives. The President had made 
up his mind before this meeting that he would take no stronger action 
than the proposed Quarantine and this meeting was only called to as-
suage those still convinced that stronger action should be taken im-
mediately. The plan that was presented was the one worked out at 
CINCLANT headquarters and in its general concept again went beyond 
the clean surgical operation and was once again turned down by the 
38 
President. The President did bring the military more towards his 
way of thinking, if indeed that was his objective of this meeting, 
by stating that the blockade on offensive weapons was only a first 
action. 
To the very end of the decision-making process the military 
held out for what they believed was the only solution, stronger action 
37 
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than the Quarantine, While they were not convinced that the rroposed 
action would do the job of removing the missiles, they came out of the 
last meetings with the President satisfied that it was only a first step 
and that it was time to get ready for the stronger application of force 
that would be needed, For this reason the military leaders went into 
the actual Crisis with the full belief that the invasion plans for Cuba, 
which were by this time in full progress, would be executed. In other 
words the strategy that was applied by President Kennedy had worked, 
both those for strong action and those opposed felt they had won, 
· CHAPTER IV 
HILI'rARY OPERATIONS 
Many stories have been written about the part played by the 
military in the Crisis. One thing is certain, it was a good test 
of the flexible response theories that had been advocated by the 
President and his managers. Bundy describes it: "No one military 
component made the difference, the existence of an adequate and rap-
idly deployable force• at all levels, was a direct result of balanced 
defenses begun in 1961."39 
Throughout the Crisis, President Kennedy stressed that force 
should be ready but should only be used to the extent it was nee-
essary. This emphasis on restraint was included in his interdiction 
1 i h . h t d th Q t" on October 23, 1962,40 proc amat on, w 1c asser e e uaran ine. 
This proclamation, which came directly from the Commander-in-
Chief, was clear in its assignment of the blockade and reconnaissance 
to be carried out through the Unified Command system. In study-
ing the post-mortems of the Crisis, the one that is most publicized 
is the clash between the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral George 
Anderson and the Secretary of Defense Robert ::-tcNamara. The way it is 
treated very of ten stresses the fact that the military resisted the 
actions taken by the President. He argues that McNamara had sensed 
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the Navy's reluctance to respond to direction from the tor and thus the 
41 
encounter with Anderson. On the surf ace this was a dramatic conflict 
and it contributed to Anderson's eventual replacement as the Chief of 
Naval Operations. From my view point, it was probably a result of a 
personality clash accented by the pressures and tensions of the situa-
tion. Nathan goes on to say that the civilians of the Defense and State 
departments grew to despise the military, He cites a mock clash that 
was set up between Averill Harriman and !-iarine General Victor "Brute" 
42 Krulak in support of this theory , Such incidents should not be used 
to outline the general feelinr, of the military during the Crisis, 
There is no doubt that some of the military leadership felt left out 
during the Crisis and that they were disappointed that stronger action 
was not taken, Under the circumstances they would not have been of much 
use to the President had they not favored a mil itary solution, a nee-
essary factor in obtaining a balanced decision, The general feeling 
of the Joint Chiefs was that this was the time to get rid of Castro, 43 
Some of the controversy between the civilian and military lead-
ers could have been avoided had everyone understood the Unified Com-
mand system and followed -it, There were times during the Cuban Crisis, 
41 
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Nathan, P• 270, General Krulak was a very colorful, fighting 
Marine who was of the "old school," Hatching him in a mock mee ting 
with the staid Harr iman could bring about a humorous situation, but 
it also proves that very often one incident or example is played up 
until it supposedly reflects the attitude of an entire grou~. 
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and in some cases still are, incidents and tendencies where military 
functions are directed through the Commander of the service concerned 
or in the worst cases through civilian agencies such as the CIA, rath-
er than the Unified Command system. The HcNamara-Anderson conflict 
could be fit into this category. Had it taken place in the CINCLANT 
War Room where all the operational information was readily available 
in display form, there would not have been any confusion. The Cuban 
Crisis clearly demonstrated that the Unified Command system will work. 
To illustrate how it functioned successfully, this writer will outline 
how the staff to which he was attached performed during the Crisis. 
In this performance, very rarely publicized, lies the key to much of 
the success of the Crisis and the heart of this thesis. In order to 
present this story it is necessary to set the scene and briefly des-
cribe the chain-of-command as it functioned relative to the staff of 
the Unified CotMlander most concerned with the Crisis. 
United States military regulations state that the Unified Com-
mander, in whose area of operations the scene of action of a military 
nature occurs, shall have control of 311 military forces within that 
area. Within this premise, any operations in the Cuban area fall un-
der the Unified Command of the Commander in Chief Atlantic .(CINCLA."'IT). 
Since this was one of the many hats of command worn by my Commander, 
Admiral William E. Dennison, the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion 
and its related political and military problems, became the center of 
attention of his steff. 44 'lost of his staff officers also participated 
in the planning and operations of his Naval Staff, Commander in Chief 
·44 
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Atlantic Fleet. (CINCLANTFLT), his North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
(NATO) Staffs, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, (SACLAl~T), and Com-
mander in Chief, Western Atlantic, (CINCWESTLANT). 
It is easy to see how such a complicated organization could cause 
some division of concentration. Very often Cor.unanders, through their 
staff organization, would literally be talking to themselve·s. CINC-
LAi.~TFLT worked for CINCLANT, so in this context, one could relay mes-
sages for action to oneself. This can be quite expeditious when things 
are moving in a hurry, but it can be rather troublesome when a mistake 
is made and in the capacity of a subordinate staff officer one had to 
originate action for the boss to chastise himself. 45 
The actual billet title assigned to the writer in the Unified Com-
mand, Fleet, and NATO staffs was that of Air Operations Officer, in the 
Operations section of each staff. Normally, the most active staff was 
CINCLANTFLT, since it operated the Atlantic Fleet forces on a day-by-
day basis through its type and operational commanders.4~ It was my 
particular assignment to monitor, on a continuing basis, the Fleet Air 
Wings and Carrier Air Wings. The other staffs, CINCWESTLANT and CINC-
45 
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from his capacity on one staff to take action in the same capacity 
on the other staff. (literally giving yourself and order). 
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The Type Commander trained and maintained the fleet's ships 
and squadrons until they were considered operationally ready for com-
bat. An example: Commander Air Forces Atlantic would supervise the 
training of new air wings on a shore base as the Type Commander for 
aircraft. When the pilots had completed their training they would be 
assigned to a Carrier which was under the Commander Second Fleet for 
operational duty. It might be a new Carrier just having achieved op-
erational readiness under the same Type Commander's shi~board training 
group. Some other Type Commanders are Commander Anti-Submarine Forces, 
Commander Service Forces, Commander Cruisers and Destroyers. 
35 
Lk~T. were under normal copdi tions engaged in planning only. Forces 
were assigned for exercises or during actual military operations. For 
example 1 the Commander Second Fleet. who normally conunands CINCL.Ai.~TFLT's 
shipborne s tr ike forces . would change to the operational control of 
CINCWESTLANT in command of the same forces, but he would now act in the 
capacity of NATO commander of shipborne strike forces and could be 
assigned forces by other NATO allies. This same Commander Second Fleet 
in CINCL.Ai.~T's Cuban operations orders would become the Commander Atlant-
ic Naval Strike Forces• again with the same ships assigned. 
Not long after my arrival at the Staff Com~ound in July 1961, the 
CINCLANT billet became the most active. because of our deep interest in 
Cuba. Specifically• the writer was assigned additional duties in early : 
1962 as the Officer-in-Charge of the Joint Reconnaissance Center. CINC-
LA.NT {JRC). In this Norfolk. Vir~inia center. physically located in 
the Joint War Room of CINCLANT-CINCLANTFLT, were undertaken all of the 
key operational functions and planning for the peripheral and overflight 
air operations and some of the sea surveillance relative to Cuha 1 with 
which these Staffs were charged. At this time electronic surveillance 
flights. weather reconnaissance, shipping surveillance, and peripheral 
photographic flights were being conducted, There were also some very 
sensitive operations designed to activate the Soviet-furnished radars 
in order to obtain more information on them, Throughout the summer of 
1962 activity in this center increased, by September we were even made 
aware of the U-2 overflights. As the Cuban problem heated up, this 
position became my primary concern and the volume of work increased un-
til by late October, 1962, the J RC part of my duties involved the super-
vision of as many as 24 Air Force, Navy 1 Army and ~'.arine off ice rs 1 a 
36 
substantial increase from the normal involvement of two officers, 
At this time it is necessary to digress and explain how the JRCs 
in the various Unified Commands, became a reality. Prior to the Gary . 
Powers U-2 incident, which was announced on ~fay 1, 1960, clandestine 
overflights and peripheral reconnaissance flights in areas of interest 
and danger were hit-and-miss and very secretive affairs, Sometimes they 
were conducted by the operations section (J-3) from the Joint Chief's 
War Room in the Pentagon and sometimes by the CIA, In short, people 
from various agencies, both civilian and military were conducting oper-
ations all over the world without proper coordination, In this pro-
cedure lay the seeds of the struggle for control of the U-2 air intel-
ligence effort between the CIA and the military, represented by the 
Strategic A!r Command, This contest was to be more firmly joined in 
the late summer and fall of 1962, Prior to the Powers' affair, clan-
destine flights controlled by the CIA passed through the areas of the 
respective Unified Commanders and were often so highly classified that 
necessary knowledge was not available to the operational and staff 
47 
units concerned, The entire reconnaissance effort was poorly org-
anized and over-classified to the point where it ended up in the trag-
edy of an international incident, 
After the embarrassment caused to President Eisenhower by the 
Powers' shoot-down, he called for an organization designed to overlap 
areas of responsibility and to center control of all reconnaiRsance 
47 
This still went on with the U-2 flight$. It was not until the 
Navy's Key West rRdar training center interce~ted a U-2 returning from 
Cuba and the pilot identified the aircraft for the ~orld to he~r, that 
information on these flights could be released to this trajning site, 
functions in one authority. The Committee of Overhead Reconnaissance 
(COMOR) became the high-level civilian controlled agency designed to 
48 
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approve future sensitive operations. To supervise the military part-
icipation in this effort the Joint Reconnaissance Center, (JRC,J-3,JCS) 
was organized with an Air Force colonel in charge and officers from the 
various services assigned for duty. A subordinate organization was 
established in each Unified Command headquarters, with direct confid-
ential voice link to the JRC in the Pentagon. At the same time, each 
Unified Commander was required to submit a monthly Reconnaissance Plan, 
which was due by the 20th of the previous month. These plans were bas-
ed on tactical requirements, desired intelligence by the CIA and other 
agencies , and technical missions involving new equipnent. The plans 
were closely examined by cm10R, coordinated with the various high mil-
itary and civilian directors concerned, and sent to the White House 
for the President's approval. Additionally, during operations of over-
flight or great risk, such as were to happen in the Cuban Crisis, the 
. -
designated staff action officer of the respective Commander would report 
to the JRC in Washington over secur ..... voice communications. It was often 
necessary to forgo this security when the need to know was at a high lev-
el, These reports were made as the aircraft entered the critical area, 
at the time of any hostile reaction, and again when the pilots report-
ed "feet wet," aviation jargon meaning the pilots were over water and 
out of immediate danger. Action officers from the Joint Chiefs or the 
respective Unified Commander's staff wer~ held directly responsible for 
immediate notification of higher authority of any unusual events not 
Abel, pp. 25-26. 
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covered by the monthly sch~dule. This system had just been organized 
by the time President Kennedy took control. It required considerable 
development, and not until the lessons learned from the Cuban Crisis 
were applied were sensitive reconnaissance operations under positive 
control. 
The disaster of the Bay of Pigs was a tragedy of paramount import-
ance . To Khrushchev it provided an opportunity to test the mettle of 
the young American ~resident and the American people. 49 To President 
Kennedy and the United States military and specifically to the CINC-
LAi.~T staff planners and this writer it became a source of primary imp-
ortance for the next two and one-half years. 
The first major concern after the Bay of Pigs was to review the 
Cuban Contingency Plans with a view to immediate execution should the 
President ever need that option. These plans had been prepared in 
early 1960, after Castro had taken power and had started to move under 
the influences of the Soviet U~ion. Their basic structure gave the 
President the option of various levels of pressure to bring about the 
downfall of the communist regime in Cuba. The options available cov-
ered a wide spectrum and were very similar to those covered when the 
Executive Committee reached its decision. Cuba, after the Bay of Pi.gs, 
was of more immediate concern , and the review of these plans was made 
on a priority basis. The many subordinate commands, which included all 
the services, the Coast Guard, and civil agencies, were required to do 
the same. In some cases the revision of these plans ~ncluded using the 
new forces and force structure that had become available under the 
49 
Charles E. Bohlen , Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York: 
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President's new policy requiring more ready forces for limited warfare. 
Execution of these plans. when ordered would fall upon the operational 
forces of CU\CLANT: for Naval action. the previously mentioned CINC-
LANTFLT• for Air Force Units• General Sweeney as CINCAFLA.~T, and for 
Army units, Commander Army Forces, Atlantic, (CO~!ARLANT), his forces 
coming from the Commander Continental Army. ((})NARC). 
'· After the initial crisis reactions to the Bay of Pigs subsided, 
action settled down to observation of the increased supply of arms and 
ammunition by the Soviets and the related increase in military activity 
and construction. Such things as the partial reinforcement and rearm-
ament with more modern weapons of Guantanamo Bay , improveraent of area 
comraunications and security , and placement of advance troops in the 
Southeastern United States operational bases were accomplished through-
out mid-1962. Additionally , contingency forces and plans were part-
ially exercised under the guise of normal exercises by joint-fleet, 
land and air forces . Based on these exercises and movement orders and 
increased intelligence , plans were up-dated and re-written during a 
continuing series of visits with the various staffs and operational 
units. During this time the writer was assigned further additional 
duty which called for regular trips to London and Paris to coordinate 
planning and to brief military staffs there on the Cuban situation . 
lioth the United States Naval Command in London and United States of-
ficers attached to the NATO command in Paris were briefed . These 
trips continued for some time after the Crisis, since Admiral Harold 
Paige Smith , Commander Naval Forces Europe was slated to relieve Ad-
miral Dennison in early 1963. 
By September 1962 , the reconnaissance effor t was increased in 
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reaction to intelligence of very suspicious military activity in Cuba. 
Electronic information collection ships were stationed on a continuous 
basis near the entrance to Havana harbor. Submarine sorties were exec-
uted, and the Reserve Air units that had been recalled in late 1961 in 
response to Khrushchev's "sabre rattling" aimed at Berlin, were integ-
50 
rated into the long-range sea surveillance plans of the regular forces. 
Some of these squadrons were deployed to Guantanamo Bay and to San Juan , 
Puerto Rico at this time . 
Several reports had been received by September 1962 that indicat-
ed the Soviets were undertaking nuclear missile installations in Cuba. 
These installations were advertised by the Soviet Union as anti-aircraft 
missile installations (SANS). A close look at all available intelligence 
revealed that this was only a cover, and it wa~ considered necessary to 
step up U-2 overflights to get more positive information. Some of the 
suspicious evidence had been collected by CINCLANT sea surveillance 
flights and consisted of photographs of large crates, similar to those 
used to transport large aircraft and missile components. The secrecy 
of all these additional reconnaissance flights was considered essential . 
Apparently it was raramount for planned diplomatic actions. From the 
standpoint of day-to-day operations, the high-level classification was 
a tremendous burden. 
Much has been said about the failure of the intelligence system 
in the Crisis. One of the severest criticisms was by Congress and in-
volved "philosophical preconception." The Senate investigation into 
this matter sharply contested the conclusion that the Soviet Union had 
50 
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never deployed missiles wi.th an offensive nuclear capability in her 
satellites prior to Cuba, They felt that the CIA should not have used 
51 this conclusion to downgrade the available evidence, Others critic-
ized the fact that concentration was centered on the stated intentions 
' 52 
of the Soviet Union, rather than the hard evidence that was available. · 
Probably a bet.ter evaluation is that the American intelligence system 
performed in its normal, bureaucratic and systematic way and the dis-
covery of the missiles was neither more or less successful than the sys-
tern was designed for. The consensus suggested by Roger Hilsman is that 
based on the information available, the Chief of Intelligence, who pro-
duced the estimate that the Soviets would not introduce offensive mis-
53 
siles into Cuba, made a reasonable and defensible judgment. 
At this time the Unified Commander was still not functioning in 
an operational capacity except for the JRC surveillance of reconnais-
sance operations and the control of some Naval units, This was a 
"gray" area throughout the Crisis, According to the plans• CINCL.Mff 
was only to take control of forces when actual operations of a milit-
ary nature were ordered. Admiral Dennison supervised the deflloyment 
of the invasion forces, but it was often necessary to revert to Navy 
or Air Force command structure in exercising control for specific sea 
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and air surveillance operations. The very nature of the command struct-
ure was so complicated that many of the forces had to be told what to 
do on a continuing basis by direct orders. This was influenced by the 
high-level control and the demands of secrecy. Many operational units 
did not have the security equipment or the clearances to receive the 
more sensitive communications. This resulted in the requirement for 
recoding and relay of many key transmissions. It also necessitated . 
many courier flights between the Norfolk headquarters and the Florida 
based units for delivery of materials and for direct briefing by staff 
officers. 
There are several versions of the struggle for power. between 
the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the CIA over the operational con-
trol of the U-2 flights. SAC finally won because it was felt that if 
another shoot-down occurred it would be better, relative to world op-
inion, to have an officer in uniform in the cockpit rather than a CIA 
agent. 54 It was unfortunate that somewhere along the line the CIA got 
into military operations. Whenever there is a need to collect sensit-
ive data or to launch limited military maneuvers in areas of concern, 
such as Cuba, it should be handled as a military operation. This is 
necessary so that when things go wrong, military forces are available 
for whatever actions might be required. Such operations need to have 
detailed emergency procedures involving full support of all the forces. 
~hese are only available to the Unified Conunander of the area concerned. 
If other procedures are used, there is much more chance for embarrass-
ment and failure, as was the case in the Powers' affair and the Bay of 
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Pigs invasion, Just before the Cuban Crisis, the issue of control be-
tween the CIA and SAC was settled, and the latter took over the U-2 
flight planning and operations, This rlaced all military operations 
around and over Cuba under the JCS, through the Unified Command system. 
where they belonged, When this is not the case, delays and problems 
have a greater probability of happening than when the normal chain of 
command is used, 
The Cuban intelligence collection effort, just before the Crisis, 
was so important that it should have involved all of the forces avail-
able, The only way this could have been done was under the JCS and the 
JRC military surveillance system with the related military intelligence 
and operational support. Had it been done in this way there would have 
been a better chance that the information on the presence of Soviet of-
fensive missiles could have been delivered to the President at an earl-
ier date than October 16, 1962. 
As soon as the intelligence indications were confirmed by the U-2 
photos, CINCLANTFLT and CINCAFLANT photo units were requested to submit 
plans for low-level overflights of the suspect areas in Cuba to provide 
pictures illustrating the U-2 high altitude information, This planning 
request had been anticipated and hand-delivered charts of routes and 
other necessary plans were made available to the JCS as quickly as jet 
aircraft and helicopter relay could deliver them to the Pentagon, Now 
secrecy really became tight. 55 ?-fy immediate superior was not cleared 
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It wRs a matter of degree of clearance. Only a few officers 
on each staff were allowed access to the so-called "back-channel" 
messages that came over a special conununications system. Such clear-
ances were dependent on the assigned billet, 
in thoRe communications channels usP.d in setti.ng up the re1uirements 
for these flightR. This does not make for the best execution and is 
very dangerous and in most cases unnecessary, Very few reople were 
briefed on the proposed actions and had the Cubans reacted with a more 
intense defensive posture. the readiness for c~unter-resronse could 
have been impaired by unnecessarily high classificRtion, This problem 
had come un durin~ the Bay of Pigs invasion when a grou!' of unmarked 
Navy fighters destined to provide air cover for the ill-fated venture 
arrived one hour late, High classification of the action message was 
the cause of this delay· which negated the usefulness of the mission. 
In any event, the planning for the first low-level overflights 
to be conducted on October 23 under the JRC system "'ere secret and 
complete in every detail, The flights vere orer~tionally monitored 
by an adjunct of CINCLA...~T ' s growin~ reconnai5sance e::,!'ire. The Joint 
Advanced Air Coordination Center (JAARC) had heen established at Key 
west , Florida, Some time prior to this Commander Key West Forces 
(CO:·IKEYWESTFOR) had been designated as the representative for the 
Unified Commander, His location at Key West gave Admiral Dennison 
a flag officer directly under his command near the scene of action, 
Protective forces for the 10t,• cltitude ohoto fli~ht~ were plan-
ned and in l"lace. An umbrella of Combat Air Patrol fi~hter aircraft 
were assigned to def end against po~sible Cuban retalliatinn flights 
and to respond to the unarmed photo aircraft shnuld they be attacked 
by the ~nr,s . These fighters were cnm1"1nsed of both carrier-based Navy 
aircraft and land-based Air Force aircraft. Limited numbers of air-
borne attack aircraft with full armament t..•ere also available. A ret-
aliation strike against the offending missile sites was planned and 
probably would have been ordered had SA?-'..S been used against the photo 
missions, Fighter escort aircraft had been considered but were dis-
carded because the low-level tactics of the photo aircraft and the 
short time over the target area were considered sufficient precaut-
ion against Cuban reaction. Also there was the que~tion of the des-
irability of not sending armed aircraft over Cuba before it was made 
necessary by Cuban actions,· 
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Orders to the photo mission pilots were specific. Their routes 
were timed to the second with a minimum time over Cuba a major object-
ive, No diversions were authorized, The aircraft were to make one 
pass. If the target was missed, there would be no return to try again 
for that particular mission, The pilots had undergone a long series 
of practice missions against targets with similar characteristics• and 
the chance of missing or wasting time over the target area was at a 
minimum, 
Everything went according to schedule, The pilots the first day 
were from the Navy' s East Coast Composite Carrier Photo Squadron (VFP-
62), The flights were launched out of the Key \lest !-\aval Air Station 
to insure arrival over target in a minimun time. Recovery ,,.ras to be 
at the squadron's Jacksonville, Florida base, where the Navy 's Aerial 
Photo Laboratory was also located, The pilots used standard, very low-
level approaches and probably evaded early radar detection, There was 
no opposition on the first mission from either the ~IGS or the S~f 
sites, 
Commander Geoq~e Eckard, Comt:landing Officer of V"t'P-62, wns the 
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flight leader, The plan covered a complete evolution which included 
development of the pictures at Jacksonville, Commander Eckard , with 
the evidence of the sensational pictures in a pouch marked for Pres-
ident Kennedy, was on his way to Washington by jet-courier in a short 
time after landing from the photo mission , A heliconter picked him un 
at Andrews Air Force Base and delivered him to the l·nlite House lawn 
so that the pictures could be made pVailable to the President immed- . 
iately , This is probably the only case in Naval history where a mis-
sion pilot was debriefed by the Co~.mander-in-Chief, 
In retrospect , when one considers the many different forces in-
volved and all the options that had to be covered it was amazing how 
this very complicated operation came to such a successful conclusion, 
The extreme interest and national importance of these first low-level 
flights put unbelievable pressures on everyone involved, Members of 
the Joint Chiefs , CO~ITAC , and Admiral Dennison were all present in 
the CINCLANT War Room to observe the status boards as the missions 
progressed. A marked sigh of relief went up , .,:.en the last pilot rep-
orted clear of Cuba and success of the mission , 
Success was even more gratifying when one considers how many 
different and sundry units were involved in the execution and support 
of these missions, SAC provided t he U-2 flights and electronic emis-
sion collection aircraft, The Continental Air Command (CONAD) ~rov­
ided airborne radar aircraft , fighters on stati~n, and air-controllers 
and facilities, Military Air Comm~nd (BAC) onerated the weather ser-
vice aircraft. TAC provided fighter supnort and back-up strike and 
photo aircraft, Naval fighter squadrons nrovided Combat Air Patrol 
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and airborne strike aircraft, plus the mission photo aircraft and the 
jet-courier. The ~arine Air Groups, deployed to Guantanamo, had fight-
er and strike responsibility should there be reaction in that sector, 
Naval and Coast Guard vessels were on station with their air rescue 
helicopters to provide rescue services should any aircraft losses occur, 
Defensive measures were also in the plans, Airborne and surface 
radar pickets, furnished by the Navy, were on station for defensive 
protection should Castro decide to launch surface action or air strikes. 
There were many highly sensitive intelligence units in place and invol-
ved in collecting reaction data. These units were charged with prov-
56 iding warnings should unusual reaction develop, 
While the previously described air action was coming to a success-
ful conclusion, rreparations for execution of the Quarantine against 
offensive weapon delivery to Cuba were in progress. This action had 
been announced by President Kennedy in his address to the nation and 
was to commence on the 24th of October, 57 Vice Admiral John S, McCain 
Jr. had been called in from his duties as Commander of the Amphibious 
Forces, Atlantic (Cm1PHIBLANT) . to head up the execution of the staff 
actions relative to the Quarantine and any other surface actions that 
might result. The numerous Soviet ships enroute to Cuba had already 
been under surveillance since they had rassed into the CINCL/u~T area. 
The forces of the Commander in Chief Europe _ (CINCEUR) had been track-
56 
This was a very refined and s ophisticated system that followed 
Cuban r esponse in minute detail. It was so e f fective that Castro's 
movements and actions were monitored almost continuously . The l"res-
ent CIA investi~ations are ex~osing some of these capabilities, i, e. 
the caJ"ability to listen to micro-Pave tele~hone convcrset:ions. 
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ing these ships and had provided the necessary information to make the 
transition easier. The surface status boards indicated ci1e position 
of each ship as it was reported entering the CINCLANT area by his long 
range patrol aircraft or surface units. When these ships reached a cer-
tain longtitude, the surface picket line took over for planned boarding 
and inspection. These ships had definite instructions, which included 
firing a disabling shot at the rudders of the transports under quest-
ion, shoul d they not compl y when requested to stop. On the effective 
date of the Quarantine, twenty-five ships were being tracked at various 
positions enroute to Cuba. Twelve of these ships sto~ped or turned 
around soon after the blockade went into effect. It is assumed that 
these carried the nuclear missile equipment of concern. 58 
The decision was made not to include tankers in the Quarantine, 
This decision made the turn-around orders easier for the Soviets, and 
when they decided to respect the blockade, tension eased and only cur-
sory action by the United States Navy was necessary. Only one ship was 
actually boarded, a freighter under the Lebanese flag, chartered by the 
Soviet Union, By the 28th of October the major problem was overcome 
when Khrushchev indicated agreement and blockade action from then on 
took on o~re limited proportions. 59 
President Kennedy had been provided with ne cessary tools for set-
t ling the issue when t he combina tion of scnsat i onRl nictures ci1at ex-
!'Os e d the Soviet Union in a lie, and the definite ~ctions of the Ouar-
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antine, forced Khrushchev.to retreat from the face-to-face challenge. 
The Cuban Crisis lasted only one week as far as the public was concern-
ed. It lasted much longer than that from the view of a staff officer 
involved in both, before and after the fact, planning and operations. 
President Kennedy considered several options as far as the Cuban 
Crisis was concerned before deciding on the Ouarantine as an initial 
step. The options of the selective "surgical air strike" followed by 
an invasion had to be kept available to the President should the block-
ade fail to bring the desired results. Just how far these plans for 
strike and/or invasion went, in order to give the President this option 
within a quick-reaction time frame, is not common knowledge. 
Immediately after the information on the presence of the offensive 
missiles became available CINCLANT ordered review of the previously ~lan-
ned Cuban actions to make them ready for what ever degree of force might 
be ordered. When the Crisis heated up, the forces were actually assig-
60 
ned, and the now familiar plans were placed in readiness for execution. 
Steps were taken to further reenforce Guantanamo and the same ship-
ping was used to evacuate the dependents. Harine aircraft based on Guan-
tanamo were placed on increased alert. ~fore sea surveillance aircraft 
were moved to Guantanamo and San Juan. Ships were deployed, including 
the requirement of at least one aircraft carrier, at sea, r eady for im-
mediate reaction to any Cuban military moves. The plans called for one 
!-larine division fron the West Coast, which was ordered to start its 
heavy eiuipment through the Panama Canal, by mid-October. Movement to 
Florida and other Southeastern United States bases was on a wholesale 
60 . 
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basis. All units, Air For~e, Army, and Navy, were in readiness for any 
required response, by the last week in October. 61 At one time a tent-
ative invasion date of October 27 was circulated. 
During this time , the previously proposed surgical air strike, 
with out invasion, was again proposed as a follow-up should the Quaran-
tine fail. This was not favored by this writer and the majority of 
those who had lived closely with the problem in a military planning 
capacity. In reply to this proposal it was again suggested that if the 
blockade and diplomatic actions did not succeed, air strikes alone would 
not insure success, unless they were followed by invasion. It was also 
argued again that the air strikes would bring as much reaction as the 
full invasion because of the casualties that would be connected with 
such an action. 62 
It had been a long time since massive movements of military men 
and equipment destined for actual warfare had taken ~lace within the 
continental limits of the United States. Although the movement of for-
ce was as secret as possible, it presented a great security problem. 
In fact it was soon determined that very little security of any kind 
could be maintained as far as movement was concerned. The plans had 
been designed for quick and forceful caoture of Cuba with the assumpt-
ion that prolonged action would be very unpopular both at home and ab-
road. Military communica tions, especially with t he kind of security 
re~uired for this type of operation were comnletely inadequate. At 
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the height of the Crisis and for several days afterwards it was almost 
impossible to complete a long distance call to Florida from the Norfolk, 
Virginia, headquarters. Leased lines had to be increased on a priority 
basis. A large number of civilian technicians and many telephone re- : 
pair and installation units from all over the country were involved in 
a crash program to solve this problem, 
Road traffic was also a planning factor, i·!ilitary units were 
held off the main highways during civilian rush hours, but some traf-
fic jams could not be avoided. No one had told the tourists to stay 
at home, and the annual trek from New York to Florida was well under 
way. Supply problems were surprisingly difficult. It soon became 
obvious that the logistic plans we had worked out would not piggy-
back on top of the normal economy and carry such extreme concentrat-
ion of military forces into a limited area of our country. After 
the main thrust of deployment was over, the snarls were soon over-
come, but since the full invasion wa$ never ordered it i$ hard to 
evaluate what would have happened to the sectional and national 
economy if the related evacuations and economic displacement had 
cnme about, 
For many days following the original low-level overflights, on 
October 23, these missions were continued, ~fissions were alternated 
between ~avy Crusader (F8U) photo aircraft and Air Force Voodoo (Fl02) 
aircraft with the same mission, Sunnort of the various aircraft and 
surface forces, was continued and refined with each mission, The 
island was under a daily blanket of electronic and nhotogra~hic sur-
veillance, ~lore sophisticated electronic and photogranhic equipment 
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was introduced, including ·experimental models. Special exercises, des-
igned to gain previously unknown information on Soviet weapons systems 
were conducted. As can be imagined, all kinds of ideas were proposed, 
but except for the loss of the U-2, piloted by ~ajor Rudolph Anderson, 
no more serious military problems were encountered. This action was 
attributed to a SA.~ site, but there was some doubt as to which ·site 
was involved and even whether the aircraft was hit by a missile. There 
was a plan to retaliate against any shoot-down of an unarmed reconnais-
sance plane by t~king out the offending SAM site with an air strike. The 
President did not choose to execute this plan. There were several 
reasons for this. The same day a U-2 operating near Siberia strayed 
into Soviet territory. The resul tant Soviet verbal reaction and the 
fact that there was considerable confusion concerning the shoot-down, 
with no immediate hard evidence that Anderson had actually been hit 
by a missile , were contributing factors. In addition the di~lomatic 
scenario was such at the time of the U-2 loss that the President want-
ed to see Khrushchev's final negotiating position before taking ad-
ditional military actions. This affair did tighten the combat readin-
ess of our forces and the Pre~ident authorized more fi~hter su~port 
for the various miRsions. 63 
Pressure on the pilots engaged in overfli~ht of Cuba w~s always 
very intense. After the Crisis ended, it was considered absolutely 
essential that photography continue in order to make sure Khrushchev 
removed the missiles and bomhers as ~romised. At the same time, it 
63 
Sorensen, p. 713. 
53 
1 . -as even r:iore important that provocation be held to a minimum. Rules 
of engagement had to be explicit, and mission pilots h ad to comply con-
rletely with the briefinr;s for the f] ights. An over-eager pilot, "t.•ho 
rr.ade a second pass at a target he had missed, a direct violation of the 
64 
rules, brought the attention of the President, hi~self. The pilot 
was severely rcpri:~anded, and his error resulted in a complete shake-
up of the squadron and the Air Force staff concerned. 5o departure from 
the established rules was tolerated; the stakes were too high . Any in-
cident could return the favorable advantage which had been gained by the 
United States during the Quarantine to the Soviet Union. 
It was a great surprise to me how the traditional service and 
inter-service rivalries became dormant during the actual days of the 
Crisis, Cooperation was almost complete during the days of late Oct-
ober and early Noveraber of 1962. However, as the wind-down comnenced, 
the submerged struggle for recognition and reward of limited budget 
dollars became more apparent, From the "neutral" riosition of control, 
the staff of the Unified Commander, it was disgusting to observe the· 
~ettiness, which our cost-effective environment, introduced by the Mc-
Namara era, had brought int0 all the services and civilian ap.encies. 
Even the actions of close associates from my own service, the Navy, 
were revolting. The plain fact was obvious . When budgets are set by 
64 
A copy of a memorandum in the President's own handwriting 
questioning this action had been sent to CINCLANT and •.ias brought to 
my attention. This was a perfect example of how everybody ran scared 
and over-reacted to anything the President ~uestioned. The memorand-
um was a simple request for an answer , why had the pilot made a second 
pass? It was immediately obvious from the debriefing that it was a 
"cockpit decision." In the headquarters of CINCLANT it was not that 
simple , everyone "covered their number , " and for days I spent valuable 
time checking messages and operations orders to make sure our staff 
had not been in error . 
,.. 
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administrators with little understandin~ of the complications of the 
kind of an exercise such as this Cris is, the problems of who pays for 
what and who gets which mission and the related monies are very for-
midable, if not impossible. A plus factor which accrued from the new 
policies of the Defense Department should also be mentioned. The new-
ly created limited warfare forces and their readiness to react on a 
short-time basis was a great advantage to military Rnd civilian plan-
ners. 65 The fact that Army units had been previou~ly married to their 
tactical air tranRports enabled these units to be left in place in their 
home bases until final execution of the plan. This alleviated some of 
the Florida congestion while at the same time still nroviding these for-
ces in a real-time fashion as required by the planned operations. In 
addition, the ~'1arine Forces with specialized training and equipment mov-
ed into Guantanamo so rapidly and with such strength that the attacks 
which could have been brought by the Cuban forces from their positions 
on the base perimeter were discouraged. Several new concepts, such as 
the Short-Field Landing and Take-off equipment installed by the Marine 
Air units showed very favorable ~romise for future operations. 
For the military, even after the agreements between President Ken-
nedy and Khrushchev, the return to normal from the Crisis was a slow 
operation. Throughout the fall of 1962 and well into the next year the 
troops involved were in a ready or semi - ready condition. The advance 
forces were kept in ~lace and logistics and communications exercises 
were conducted on a regular basis to insure smooth nerformance in these 
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critical a reas if the invasion was ordered. :tany ?Ost-mortem critiques 
were held• and on the basis of t hese CINCLA~-l'T and suprorting conunand 
operations orders were completely re-written to reflect the lessons 
learned, 
CHAPTER V 
T:·rn AFTER:IATH 
Cuba, as a military problem, occupied a major position in the re-
quirer.ients rlaced on the United States forces. CINCLANT came out of the 
Crisis ,,•ith a problem of maintaining control over continuing surveil-
ance efforts. It ~as necessary to keeo plans current in order to be 
responsive to actions that might be called for as the diplomatic drama 
between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba went on. 
The Crisis had shown many weaknesses in the planning for action 
against Cuba, especially in comr:iunications and logistics. The plans had 
to be adjusted to take care of transportation problems should a repeat 
movement through the high-density traffic areas of the Southeastern 
United States be necessary. 
For a time pressure had to he maintained with low-level aerial 
photography, electronic listening and survei~lance of Soviet llloc ship-
ping to insure reraoval of the offensive wea~ons. 
According to Harold ~1acmillan, the Cuban "Missile Crisis re~res-
ented, "one of the izreatest turnini:; points in history." President 
Kennedy said: 
The autunn of 1962 1 if not a turning point, was at least a 
climactic period, even though its effects can't be fully per-
ceived now, Future historians looking back at 1962 may well 
mark the year as the time when the tide began to turn. 66 
From my viewpoint, as one who really "felt the tension" of those 
days and deep sense of relief when it was over, this ~riter's initial 
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reaction was that it was ~ome kind of turning point, 
The effects of the Cuban ~fissile Crisis on the United States 
military can be divided into three broad categories . First, there were 
significant diplor.iatic results that would bring about a change in the 
direction of American foreign policy. This in turn would have both dir-
ect and indirect influence on the United States amed forces. Second , 
there were certain internal decisions and influences in the United States 
which led to affirmation of the new look policies of the Defense Depart-
ment• especially in the fields of crisis reaction and firmer and more 
centralized direction from the White House and the Office of the Secret-
ary of Defense, Third , there were many lessons learned in the employ-
ment and design of military hardware • inter-service cooperation , command 
and control and intelligence gathering procedures, Each one of these 
factors will be examined in detail as they influenced the direction of 
the military and the lessons they learned from the Crisis, 
The diplomatic reactions and conclusions will be discussed first 
with an observation on how each decision effected United States foreir,n 
policy , and in turn had either a direct or indirect influence on the 
United States armed forces. 
The most dramatic lesson learned was by the Soviet Union. Her 
leaders were faced with the dangers of direct nuclear confrontation 
I 
with the United States because of their miscalculations in Cuba. It 
must have been clear to them , from all that has been written and said• 
just how close the United States came to invading Cuba with the possible 
escalation of that action into thermo- nuclear war. This lesson led to 
such actions as the set ting up of the hot-line between the two leaders. 
It also started the road to the test ban treaty of 1963 and in this 
lies the beginning of an accommodation between the Soviet Union and 
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the United States. This factor had a direct effect in the overall strat-
egy of United States military planning. It brought about such things as 
the involvement of the fililitary in the Strategic Arms LiQitations Talks 
(SALT) and related natters with the planning for reduction of nuclear 
weapons, 
The Crisis did not end the Cold War, It did however bring about 
a definite change in attitude between the two principals , The United 
States, the Soviet Union, and in fact all the principal world powers 
realized the polarization of power more than ever in the two great riv-
als , This again brought home the fact to the United States military 
planners that major war involving nuclear weapons , if it happened , 
would in all probability be between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. Additionally , it was more apparent than ever that limited wars , 
wherever th.ey occurred, would involve the two super-powers on ouposite 
sides, either in an active role or in a position of supplying weaponry 
and military advice to the nations involved, 
Another significant result was the affirmation by both the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the latter perhaps reluctantly, of a com-
mon interest in the minimum rules of world order, They must decide on 
nuclear war thenselves and not permit unstable parties, such as Castro , 
to be in a position to launch or cause nuclear war , The effect of this 
was significant in the American future military planning, Such plans 
now must include forces with the capability to isolate unstable nations 
and leadership with expeditious actions , otherwise small rebellions or 
internal struggle for pow~r would soon see the two super-powers on 
opposite sides. This would result in escalation and the danger of 
thermo-nuclear war. 
The Crisis illustrated that the United Nations can only provide 
59 
a forum for public debate between the Soviet Union and the United States 
when the two powers are in serious conflict. Even when a third power 
such as Cuba was involved, the major decisions fell on the leadership 
of the two giants. No matter w~o talked during the Crisis, President 
Kennedy or Premier Khrushchev were pulling the string~. The dream that 
the United Nations could by itself settle disputes was again proven 
false. American leaders realized that present world political consid-
erations were too complex and unsettled for this to happen. For the 
present, it was necessary to maintain strong and ready military forces 
with both conventional and nuclear capability. Only from this position 
of strength could favorable conclusions be forged. 
This lesson, that firmness of purpose and proper ap~lication of 
power were important elements in bringing about favorable diplomatic 
settlements, is considered by many, including this writer, the most 
important result comin~ from the Crisis. This feeling, that power and 
force are necessary, can be evaluated as being the underlying cause 
of the involvement and the escalation of the Vie tnamese War. Unfortun-
ately when this policy was applied to Southeast Asia it became inter-
spersed with indecision and loss of purriose. Ti1us one can conclude that 
the tragic military involvement in the recently concluded Vietnam War 
had some of its seeds in the Cuban Crisis. 
The Crisis delivered international law another very dama,:i:ing blow. 
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The legality of the Quarantine became a major ~oint of controversy, 
George Ball 1 one of the Crisis managers , stated that we no longer live 
under the "rule of law," He went on to say that peace is maintained 
under the precarious balance of power between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, .American foreign policy is primarily orientated to 
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maintain this balance, The effect of this on the military can only 
be an indirect one, If one wanted to make a direct connection it 
would not be difficult to roint out the fact that many in the military 
fel t that the disregard of strict "rule of law" could be extended to 
military field actions, From that point it would not be difficult to 
sreculate that herein lies the seed of some of the violations of the 
Rules of Warfare that became prominent in the Vietnam War on both sides, 
The allies of both the Soviet Union and the United States were 
shocked when they saw how close the world was brought to thermo-nuclear 
conflict without significant representation by them, From this judg-
ment there were two general recommendations for solution, Some of the 
allies wanted representation in future decisions through their resp-
ective treaty organizations and the United Nations, Others wanted to 
strengthen or to create their own nuclear arsenals so that they could 
participate in the nuclear game, The immediate effect in this regard 
on the American military was that as the number of nations with nuclear 
weapons increased, offensive su,port of defensive, strategic planning 
took on new complications, 
Castro felt like he had been sold out by the Soviet Union and 
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for a while he echoed the.Chinese criticis~s of Khrushchev's actions~ 
It took a long visit frofil Soviet Foreign ~linister Anastas :akoyan to 
calm the Cuban leader. Castro also discredited himself with other 
Latin American countries because he ~ermitted the Soviets to install 
the missiles , 68 The problem that the Soviets had in convincing Castro 
that the removal of the offensive weapons was necessary kept the heat 
on the United States military to keep forces in a ready condition for 
some time after the Crisis. It also required continuance of the rec-
onnaisance efforts to keep the pressure on Castro to agree to the re-
moval of the offensive missiles and the IL-28 bombers . 
Both the Soviet Union and the United States moved their decis-
ion-making process to the summit of their resnective hierarchies . 
They both functioned with the utmost secrecy, The final decision was 
brought about by the direct confrontation of the respective leaders , 
Khrushchev and President Kennedy, Here is a series of important fact-
ors that created problems in military onerations during _and after 
the Crisis. The secrecy factor in itself was a handicap but was minor 
when compared to the fact that a T:irecedent was set which moved the op-
erational decision-making process for the United States military to 
complete centralization in Washington. This nrecedent continued to 
grow and later again cane to this writer'.s attention when-he .was a 
member of the controlling staff for carrier su~nort onerations for the 
Vietnam War , Commander Task Force Seventy-Seven (CTF- 77). As the Air 
Operations Officer on this staff, my main duty was the supervision of 
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Naval air strikes against North Vietnamese targets, Centralization 
had reached such a ridiculous level that aerial targets were being 
selected in Washington by self-styled experts, many of whom were not 
aware of the tactical situation, This resulted in a ver~ i nefficient 
operation, caused la~ morale among the aircrews, and, even more un-
fortunately, wasted manpower and materials. A favorite bombing tar-
get examnle; that will always be a classic in air strike planning, 
came from this Washington description: "suspected underground oil 
storage sites, 1169 
The Cuban ~!issile Crisis deepened the Chinese-Soviet rift, The 
Chinese accused Khrushchev of appeasement and another " !-fonich." They 
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made it clear in several statements that the Crisis !'roved that Khrush-
chev overestimated the importance of nuclear weanons, A further Chin-
ese evaluation was that Khrushehev's short-range gamhle was reckless 
and his long-range policy abandoned the revolutionary struggles of the 
~asses. 7° China's actions and criticisms of the Soviet leader would 
be a contributing fact.or in the subsequent improvement in United States-
Chinese relations and the complicated diplomatic reactions which made 
the Soviet Union move toward further actions leading to detente with the 
United States, An added factor was a · lesseninp, of the China ~roblem 
which could eventually simplify United States military requirements, 
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This fiasco resulted in my early retirement from the Navy under 
less than happy conditions, ~1y first civilian emplo)'T'lent was at Johns-
llo!'kins University's Applied Physics .Laboratory, where three futile months 
were spent as a consultant. During this time most of my time was used 
trying to convince the powers-to-be, to return tactical air o~erations 
to the oilots cockpit under the direct su~ervision of Task Force Commander, 
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These better relations between the United States and the Chinese have 
been severely handicapped by the Chinese Nationalist problem and the 
late and militarily unsatisfactory settlement of the \'ictnam War, so 
there has been very little chang~ · in · ~trategic ·militai;y planning, 
As for the effect of the Crisis on the American military result-
ant from internal policy decisions, Probably the most important of these 
was the reaction to the concern by President Kennedy with the "military 
response" he received throughout from his advisors. He was determined 
to take steps to ease tensions ~ith the Soviet Union in order to allow 
some "elbow room•" short of nuclear threats, should other confrontations 
come, 
To understand the effect this had on tl1e military it is necessary 
to examine the attitude of President Kennedy toward them. Although much 
has been written to the contrary, it •.-1as obvious that the President ¥:as 
desirous of havinP, good relationship with the military, hut that this 
would have to be on his own terms. Be desired to move younger men into 
rositions of power . 71 This had been sho\Jn in an early move 'INhen he re-
placed Adr.liral Arleigh J3urke on the Joint Chiefs with a younger Admir-
al Anderson. lie also rroved that he ,,•anted men Oflerating under his o·.m 
terms when he did not reappoint Admi ral Anderson as the Chief of X:\vr1l 
O~erations but at the same time . used- his talents bv appointin;; hie as 
Ambassador to Spain. 
President Kennedy ffiade it clear throu~hout the Crisis and after-
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wards that he would exercise firm control of the military and that 'he 
would handle emergencies at the highest level in order to permit the 
kind of selective response required to minimize the danger of nuclear 
... 
confrontation, He had shown his disappointment with the ''military 
response" that had been given to him· by top military advisors as the 
only action available, It was now clear that in future decisions the 
President would require that the military leadership consider other 
than purely military options. 
Generally, it can be said that the Cuban Crisis was a watershed 
for the United States military. They becane more involved in polit-
ical maneuvering by Congress and the President. The politics conect-
ed with the Crisis often included reference to military readiness and 
generally put the American military more into the public limelight 
than they had heen since the Korean War. Whether they were in agree-
ment or not with the new policies of crisis management, flexible res-
ponse , cost effectiveness and centralized control, these things were 
now a fact of life and had to be accepted by the military. The very 
success achieved by the military during the crisis gave the new look 
of the defense establishment the credibility of success in its first 
great test. 
General Maxwell Taylor was firmly interposed between the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the President as a result of his performance 
throughout the Crisis. Along with this went the firm establishment 
of a "War Room" in the White House with the President's security dir-
ector, :-1cGeorge Bundy, in charge. These men became very close to the 
President and often worked outside the regular military channels to 
keep close track of military operations, When an error, such as the 
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"like ducks in a ro"'" parking of Air Force aircraft in Florida. was 
discovered, they illustrated it, repeated it, and overplayed it to the 
point of great embarrassment and irritation of the military. In act-
uality they kept their own military displays and very frequently re-
sorted to direct communications with advance military units to gather 
information the President wanted or they thought he might want. 
Secretary McNamara came out of the Crisis firmly in charge. His 
youthful advisors, who became known as the "Whiz Kids," gained consid-
erable stature and had to be accepted by the military traditionalists 
as a matter of career survival. ~lany could not accept the new order, 
and there were premature retirements in all branches of the services. 
In conclusion, the following is a discussion of military achieve-
ments and the lessons learned in tactics, command and control and in 
the use of new weapons and surveillance equipment. 
The Unified Command system proved that it could work in srite of 
misunderstandings and inter-service rivalries. The preparations for 
the invasion were exreditious and were executed under the firm control 
of CINCLANT. The advance planning, although it had overlooked some 
trying logistics problem~, had heen adequate, and the experience of the 
Crisis deployment would be valuable in any future Cuban planning. It 
should be mentioned that many in high places did not realize the amount 
of planning and exercisinr, that had been engaged in to get the armed 
forces ready for actions such as those called for during the Crisis. 
In this lies one of the greatest reasons for success, which has never 
been mentioned in the post-crisis plaudits or criticisms, 
The intelligence co~munity, including the military hranches, suf-
..fered an initial blow because of all the controversy connected with the 
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evaluation of availab l e information prior to the Crisis, This result-
ed in many investigations, some of which are or will be reflected in 
the present high-level investigations of CIA activities. There is no 
doubt that the CIA and other agencies were deeply involved i n s e r ious 
attempts to solve the Cuban problem and that they considered all options 
in settling the very difficult situation, Given the mood of and the 
danger to the country at the time, these efforts were justified, A fin-
a l review of the performance of the CIA and its military counterparts 
brings their actions and recommendations into a more favorable light. 
A good effect of the Crisis was that relative to Cuba the CIA was re-
moved, at least for a time, from direct control of forces with milit-
ary responsibilities, 
The Unified Command system functioned well, especiRlly during 
the days of the Crisis, Command and control appeared satisfactory, 
but soon after the Crisis a recently created Unified Commander, Com-
mander in Chief Strike Command (CINCSTRIKE) was interposed into the 
Cuban planning picture. This set up another great power struggle, well 
laced with the ingredients of a traditional Army-Navy struggle, with 
the Air Force alternatinp, betw~en the · ~wo as indicated, for its own 
benefit. The forces Assigned to ' this . new organization were the same 
as those required for CINCLANT's Cuban operations . The idea behind 
this incorporation of ready arny forces , the Tactical Air Command 
and airlift forces was probably a sound concept, but it was implement-
ed in an arbitrary way with very confusing and incomplete instructions, 
It further complicated an already over-complicated system, The creat-
ion of the Unified Strike Command was uncalled for and could only lead 
to more confusion in the military co~mand and control estahlishment. 
The importance of h~ving a controlled, unified and efficient 
reconnaissance system was illustrated before, during , and after the 
Crisis. Any operation which violates the airspace of a target country 
is inherently dnagerous, l .. nen it hris the ad di tion;:il limelight of int-
ernational interest, it borders continuously on calamity and crisis. 
The operations necessary to secure the required information relative 
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to the offensive missiles in Cuba were and probably still are the most 
extensive operations of this nature ever conducted by any military force. 
Many new techniques ~·ere used and many established intelligence gather-
ing activities were perfected, The presence of modern Soviet electron-
ic systems connected with the SAMS, MIGS, and other installations gave 
our electronic information gathering forces an outstanding opportunity 
to gather or confirm information that had great value in future planning 
against Soviet equipment, Huch of the information gathered relative 
to the Soviet SAH sites proved invaluable in perfecting countermeasures 
later used in attack aircraft against targets in North Vietnam, which 
were guarded by similar Soviet-furnished installations. The syste:n of 
reconnaissance control that had been established directly under the 
JCS functioned in an excellent manner by the time the Crisis was over, 
It overcame the handicaps of very centralized control and a high degree 
of secrecy, plus the many last minute changes in top-level orders, 
For years many have maintained that control of electronic emmis-
sions and the related electronic environment will be very important in 
deciding any future military engagement. Cuba, around the time of the 
Crisis, became the objective of a very large concentration of electron-
ic intelligence units, all ready and eager to prove this point, Aerial 
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squadrons, with the missipn of listening to and evaluating Soviet equip-
ment, were brought together from all over the world to gather data, 
Surface and sub-surf ace units, equipped for special surveillance, car-
ried out sensitive approaches to suspect areas to get the Cubans to 
"light-up" their radars so that desired pulse-rates, frequencies, and 
other characteristics could be delicately measured and recorded. In 
this area it was especially difficult to control the various agencies, 
each of whom had their own ideas of how to accomplish the mission. Very 
of ten there was tendency to hide behind high classification of equip-
ment in order to keep operational objectives hidden, It was almost un-
believable how much new equipment "came out of the wood-work'," ready 
to be tested aiainst an environment of Soviet electronic equipment. 
With all the activity in progress, emission control became a trying 
problem. At first, the confusion ·often led to one unit interfering 
with another, almost to the point where they literally "jammed11 72 
each other's equipment, It was not until after the Crisis, when the 
JARCC in Key West was located in the same facility with the Cantin-
ental Air Defense Command north of the. City that completely satis-
factory control was achieved. Highly ~lassified and ultra-sensitive 
listening was accomplished relative to Cuban-Soviet communications 
networks, Very significant contributions to the military effort in 
this field came from a CIA controlled ship stationed near Havana, 
The entire spectrum of military communications, from the field 
units to the special, semi-secure, leased line between CINCLANT and 
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Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier in San Juan 1 was under constant pres-
sure throughout the Crisis. The existing facilities were completely in-
adequate at the beginning, but with the full cooperation of commercial 
telephone companies. they were brought to an acceptable condition by 
the end of the Crisis. It is ~y estimation that a major communications 
overload condition would have come about had the full.invasion been ord-
ered. For some time during the most trying periods of the Crisis , an 
official condition of communications control 1 Operation ~inimize 1 was 
established to eliminate unnecessary traffic. Lessons learned were ap~ 
plied in a staff revision of the communications annex to CINCLANT's 
Cuban Operations Order. It also resulted in the immediate increase in 
priority for the new headquarters building and improved facilities for 
communications at CINCLANT's Norfolk compound. 
~ost of the principals involved at the working level of the Cris-
is concurred that military operations were seriously handicapped by 
the high security clasRifications. Ever since crisis management became 
the watchword of the new defense establishment 1 secrecy was paramount. 
To this writer it seemed that classification was used to build empires, 
since certain individuals at every level of control equated high clas-
sif ication with importance of action. Highly sensitive and important 
communications channels and procedures that were never intended for such 
purposes were used for mounds of traffic that could have been relegated 
to more normal channels. Not only was such a situation operationally 
inefficient, but it threatened compromise of a very necessary and ex-
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The cost of leasing this line was 25 , 000 dollars per month , 
t remely expensive system ·of intelligence communications, Unfortunat-
ely, not much was learned fr om this experience because the same prob-
le~s ~ere encountered during my tour in Vietnam, 
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An additional impact of the Crisis was that the three individual 
services were given some new roles and also were required to place 
emphasis on other assignments that had been given lesser priority, 
The Navy, in pursuit of the objectives of the Quarantine, was 
required to use new techniques of gathering information on Soviet ship-
ping, ~avy ships were required to remain on station for long periods 
of time under great restraint and sometimes with conflicting and ever-
changing instructions, Naval forces were given an excellent opport-
unity to exercise newly developed anti-submarine tactics, altn9ugh -this : 
created controversy because of the danger foreseen by the President dur-
ing the Crisis, He f~lt this application of approved techniques against 
the Soviet submarines could result in a direct clash with Soviet forces, 
I n fact there ~ere sever~! very active incidents with Soviet sub~arines 
causing several of them to surface, Experience was also gained by the 
~favy' s Carrier Task Forces. They again proved that such ships could 
respond with much less expense and confusion than air units which had 
to depend on land air bases close to enemy territory for their support, 
The long-range patrol aircraft made excellent use of the Naval Reserve 
squadrons that had been recalled to active duty. They also improved 
their communications procedures and perf ected some excell ent photo-
graphic techniques when they were required to furnish photos of deck-
cargo loads with enough resolution fer intelligence on Soviet missiles 
and support equipment. Ship-borne helicopters proved themselves ab-
solutely essential to the r0le of close surveillance required by the 
Quarantine. Their pictures were ·particularly helpful in determining 
that the missiles were actually removed. 
The Army's greatest benefit came from the exercising of its 
combat-ready, quick-reaction forces. Xany problems of cooperation 
with the Tactical Air Command forces were worked out. Airlift prob-
lems became apparent, and as a result Reserves were called up as a 
short-range solution, while improved planning and equipment were 
provided for long range answers to the problems. Base and communic-
ations facilities were inadequate to accommodate the large numbers of 
Army forces deployed. As a result of this, valuable experience in 
base renovation was gained and the Army engineers were able to ev-
aluate some of their new construction techniques . Army light air-
craft forces had a significant mission in the operational order for 
the invasion of Cuba. As a result of the Crisis , they were moved to 
Florida and were able to operate from airfields under fon.rard area 
conditions. In addition, these and other Army forces gained exper-
ience in troop and equipment load-out into tactical vessels. 
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The Air Force probably had the most difficult time. The base 
best suited for their tactical air operations, Homestead Air Force 
Base, Florida , was predominantly occupied by SAC and was equipped for 
large aircraft operations. Parking facilities at this field and others 
designated for the support of the invasion were inadequate, a fact that 
led to the close-parking situation for which CINCLANT and Air Force 
planners were so severely criticized. There was a considerable prob-
lem with priorities . The main clash came between the air defense and 
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r econnaissance fo r ces who were actually fly ing sorties in connection 
with the Cri sis and the tacti cal s t rike forces who had to be ready 
to go. Bo th had to use the s ame base facilities and sup!"orting aerial 
tankers. It f inally got to the point where directives from the Unified 
Cor.unander and the JCS were required to settle some of these problems. 
In retrospect. the Cuban Crisis. as far as military actions were 
concerned, brought many benefits. Probably the greatest of these ben-
efits came from the fact that they were able to adjust their actions 
as requirements from the President were increased or decreased during 
the rapidly changing situation. Constraint of forces that are mot-
ivated and ready to go. as was the case in Cuba, can be a very diffi-
cult situation for the immediate Commander and all the way up the 
chain-of-command to the President. It has always been amazing to this 
writer that more serious incidents did not occur. 
On the other hand• what happened in the Crisis as far as the use 
of the military is concerned should have been a warning for what was 
to come in Vietnam. Communications is the backbone of all military 
operations. What follows is that the better the communications, the 
more centralized the control of an operation will hec0me. The Cuban 
Missile Crisis was another step in the movement of onerational control 
of the military forces into the White House. This is particularly true 
when operations are critical to international relations, such as the 
nnes. connected with ·the C.risis •. . The world-wide policy of "flexible 
response" brought about the ''crisis managers" that John Donovan talks 
about in his book, rhe Cold Warriors.74 The principal managers in-
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valved in the Cuban Crisis included Bundy 1 Sorensen, Robert Kennedy, 
General Taylor, McNamara, Paul Nitze 1 Roswell Gilpatrick and Rusk. 75 
Not only were they members of the famous Executive Committee, but 
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they established their own War Room in the \.fuite Rouse. Although they 
consulted with the Joint Chiefs, there were times when a junior 
officer 1 such as the writer, was required to update directly, through 
the White House switchboard. This starts to reflect down the line and 
causes confusion and discontent. The Joint Chiefs in turn by-pass 
the Unified Commander and talk directly to operational units, The sit-
uation really became difficult and this method of operation fostered 
by the crisis managers and firm control at the top of every detail, 
destroys the intiative of the on-the-scene Commander, who must, even 
in modern warfare, still make decisions without consulting the l~1ite 
House, 
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